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Preface 
This working paper represents research conducted for the Negotiation Laboratory of the 
Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Project during the Summer 1991. Negotiating flexibility 
is defined behaviorally as the moves and counter-moves made by negotiating actors that lead to 
adjustments from their initial positions and possibly to compromise and agreement among the parties. 
Thus, it is a central concept in the analysis of negotiation processes. 
In this paper, Dr. Druckman explores the concept in a systematic and empirical fashion, 
seeking to understand the situational correlates that make flexibility in negotiating behavior more 
likely. The research literature on flexibility has focused primarily on the impact of situational factor 
taken one at a time. In this paper, Dr. Druckman has designed an interesting scenario questionnaire 
that facilitates the examination of multiple situational factors simultaneously. Through statistical 
analysis of paired-comparison data, he is able to evaluate the relative importance of each situational 
factor on negotiating flexibility. The analysis presented here represents a pilot test of this approach. 
A Negotiating Flexibility Study Group has been established by the PIN Project to continue 
this line of research and conduct a collaborative multi-method research program concerning this 
essential dynamic in the negotiation process. 
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The Situational Levers of Negotiating Flexibility1 
Daniel Druckman 
This is an experimental study of some aspects of a negotiation situation that may influence a 
bargainer's decisions about his or her positions and tactics. The experiment is an attempt to explore 
hypothesized relationships between these types of variables in the setting of a simulated international 
conference on environmental regulation. It is regarded as a next step in a progression of analytical 
work on these relationships. In order to place the experiment in that analytical context, a general 
discussion of the meaning of negotiating flexibility and of situational levers precedes a description of 
methods and results. A final section develops implications of the findings for further work on this 
topic. 
What is Negotiating Flexibility? 
Flexibility in negotiation is indicated by a variety of behaviors which may be correlated. In gaming 
studies it is the cooperative choice in the game matrix. This choice reflects a willingness to accept 
a smaller payoff than is possible to obtain while trusting that the other will also cooperate. If he does 
not cooperate, you lose and he wins. There are risks involved in both cooperative and competitive 
choices: a cooperative choice may be exploited; a competitive choice may lead to mutual losses. The 
matrix used by Wilson (1971) illustrates this dilemma. 
Player 2 
Cooperate Compete 
Cooperate 2,2 -1,4 
Player 1 
Compete 4,-1 0,o 
Both choices in this matrix pose a dilemma. By choosing to cooperate, the decision maker risks the 
possibility of being exploited and losing (-1); by choosing to compete, the decision maker risks no 
gain (0). The risk is, however reduced by the possibility of retaliation in future moves; an habitual 
competitor is punished by reciprocated competitive moves, reducing his payoffs substantially. This 
definition may capture the basic dimension of the concept, which is the expectation that the other will 
reci~rocate one's willingness to concede some gain. One is, however, unlikely to continue to 
cooperate in the absence of reciprocity. Failure to reciprocate a cooperative move is likely to reduce 
one's willingness to continue to cooperate, leading often to competitive spirals and stalemates. 
This idea is captured in Gouldner's (1960) concept of a "reciprocity norm" and in Osgood's (1979) 
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GRIT strategy (Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction). Many studies have shown that one's 
failure to reciprocate another's cooperative gesture produces anger and reduces the other's willingness 
to cooperate. [See Druckrnan's (1990) review of this literature.] Osgood proposed a strategy for 
reducing cold war tensions based on making unilateral cooperative moves contingent on eventual 
reciprocation. His decision maker is cooperative to a ~o in t ;  tolerance has its limits which are reached 
after several attempts have been made to demonstrate cooperation without reciprocated cooperation 
on the part of an opponent. 
The focus of this work is on the dynamics of interactions where moves and counter-moves are made 
through time. Strings of mutually cooperative moves demonstrate flexibility whereas strings of 
mutually competitive moves demonstrate toughness or inflexibility in terms of sticking to a strategy 
intended to maximize one's own returns. [Wilson (1971) measured such strings of cooperative and 
competitive moves over trials.] The conception of competitive and cooperative moves made in 
interactive games corresponds to changing or not changing positions on issues during a negotiation. 
Cooperation consists of moving in the direction of the other's positions or away from one's own 
initial position, demonstrating flexibility. Competition consists of sticking to your own position in 
the hope that others will move toward that position, resulting in one's own position prevailing as the 
outcome of the negotiation. The experimental gaming research (and the game theory models) 
concentrate primarily on interaction dynamics, positing an outcome that emerges from patterns of 
choices through time. Similarly, outcomes in negotiation can emerge from patterns of position change 
through time as illustrated by Ikle and Leites (1962). 
Flexibility can be shown to occur in other ways and may be influenced by aspects of the situation 
other than (or in addition to) the opponent's moves or concessions. It can be reflected in the verbal 
exchanges between negotiators or in their perceptions of the situation and opponent. Process analysis 
coding of "hard" and "soft" rhetoric or of revealed commonalities and differences in positions can 
be regarded as indications of flexible or inflexible negotiating behavior, whether or not public 
movement from initial positions has occurred . [See Druckrnan and Hopmann (1991) for a discussion 
of the uses of content analysis in negotiation.] Responses to questions about perceived commitment 
to positions about perceived incompatibility between positions, about whether the situation is viewed 
more as a win-lose contest or as a problem-solving debate, and the willinmess to seek either 
compromise or integrative agreements may also be indicators of flexible or inflexible behavior. The 
perceptions may be construed as variables that intervene between the situation and negotiating 
behavior as depicted, for example, by the model used to explain results obtained in the bargaining 
study by Druckrnan, Broome, and Korper (1988). 
Flexible (or inflexible) behavior may occur during any stage of a negotiation, and may take different 
forms from one stage to the next. It may consist of decisions that lead to movement from initial 
positions or to agreements. Here are some examples of decisions that indicate flexibility in each of 
four stages thought to capture the progression of many talks (see Druckman, 1990a). 
o During the preparation period: A willingness to studv the issues from the perspective of 
other parties, including attempts to reverse roles; a search for possible solutions that are 
integrative or that serve to maximize the return of all parties, and efforts to de-emphasize the 
ideological aspects of issues. 
o At the early periods when parties "set the stage" for the discussions to come: A willingness 
to disagnrenate issues, to consider the possibility of partial agreements if a comprehensive 
agreement is not possible; a willingness to hold many informal meetinns with delegates of 
other nations to explore the issues outside plenary sessions, and a willingness to consider a 
variety of dternative formats and venues for holding the sessions. 
o During the "give-and-take" discussions: The discovery of a formula or framework for 
defining issues suitable for bargaining; a willingness to incornorate in one's own proposals 
arguments made by delegates from other nations, including reversing roles during the 
debating, and, recognizing and the seizing upon turning ~o in t s  that may occur during the 
process. 
o During the endgame: A willingness to make wncessions in order to get an agreement; the 
offering of proposals intended to avoid im~asses, and a willingness to let contentious issues 
go unresolved in order to get an agreement. 
These decisions are examples of flexible behaviors. They are also decisions that may influence 
movement in negotiation as indicated by measures developed in gaming experiments, simulations, and 
case studies. Measures of choices made in the gaming studies are attempts to distinguish cooperative 
from competitive decisions. Flexibility is defined as a willingness to forfeit some gain in order either 
to avoid loses (in game-matrix studies) or to avoid deadlocks (in board-game studies). In the 
game-matrix experiments, these include the total number of cooperative choices, number of 
cooperative choices as a function of trials, and strings of mutually cooperative or competitive moves 
(Wilson, 1971). Examples of measures used in board-game experiments are the total number of 
offers, number of the other's offers accepted, difference in outcomes, and the difference in offers 
made "toward" versus "away" from the opponent's interests as these are defined in tasks where 
players distribute limited resources among themselves (Druckman, Solomon, and Zechmeister, 1972; 
Druckman et al., 1976). 
The dependent variables used frequently in simulations are variations on yielding from initial positions 
on issues defined in the scenarios: for example, total dyadic yielding from initial positions, distance 
apart on each issue at the conclusion of the talks, symmetry of final offers, relative payoffs or other 
outcomes indicating which party gains more, number of issues resolved, rate of concession making 
from one period to the next, average demand, private position change by issue (Bartos, 1974; 
Brehmer and Harnmond, 1977). Another measure used in some studies is speed to resolution of the 
issues (Druckman, 1968). Pruitt (1981) has developed indicators of integrative agreements where 
parties strive for better outcomes than compromises. Perceptual measures of flexibility used in these 
studies have included extent of commitment to positions, expressed willingness to compromise, views 
of the situation as win-lose or problem- solving, and evaluations of the negotiating climate and 
opponent (Zechmeister and Druckman, 1973; Druckman and Broome, 1991). In some simulation 
studies, investigators have content analyzed the transcripts to develop measures of "hard and "soft" 
negotiating behavior (Hopmann and Walcott, 1977) or revealed similarities and differences 
(Zechmeister and Druckman, 1973). 
Analytical case studies of negotiation have focused primarily on the process. Some studies have 
developed modified versions of measures used in laboratory experiments: for example, Jensen's 
(1988) index of the amount of concessions reflected in proposals, Hopmann's (e.g., Hopmann and 
Smith, 1977) index of hard and soft negotiating rhetoric, and King's (1976) index of role- reversing 
effectiveness. Other studies have devised new measures appropriate to the real-world contexts in 
which the case occurs: for example, the ratio of impasses to turning points, stressing commonalities 
or differences in the discussion, revealing and concealing positions, the rate at which the talks move 
through stages, the use of bracketing as a veto of other parties' proposals, and the extent to which 
others' proposals are incorporated in one's own positions. Using these measures, we have learned 
about the effects of power asymmetries and other structural variables (Hopmann, 1978), some causes 
of impasses (Druckman, 1986), patterns of responsiveness (Hopmann and Smith, 1977; Jensen, 1984; 
Stoll and McAndrew, 1986; Druckman and Harris, 1990), frequencies of cooperative or 
role-reversing behavior (King, 1976; Lebedeva, 1991), possible influences of external events 
(Hopmann, 1972; Hopmann and King, 1976), and the role of creativity in negotiation (Spector, 
1991). 
One issue in the analytical work is the extent to which the various measures are correlated: Are they 
independent or interchangeable indicators of negotiating flexibility?, How many ways are there to 
measure flexibility?, What are the dimensions of flexibility?, Are there separate indicators of each of 
these dimensions? Another issue concerns comparative work: What are the key situational 
determinants of flexible behavior?, Do these relationships vary from one setting to another?, Do they 
vary from the laboratory to similar real-world cases? Comparable measures should facilitate 
comparative work, enabling us to assess case similarity as well as to discover relationships between 
situations or contexts and negotiating behavior. A step in this direction is taken in the experiment 
reported below. 
What are the Situational Levers? 
Various aspects of the situation have been shown to influence a negotiator's flexibility or movement 
from initial positions. We have discussed some effects of the other's moves or concessions above, 
and have given examples of decisions that may produce flexible behavior. These and other variables 
can be categorized under the headings of issues, background factors, context, structure of conference 
and parties, and the immediate situation facing negotiators. We know something about how these 
factors impact on negotiators' perceptions leading either to cooperative or competitive behavior, to 
agreements or impasses. It may even be possible to indicate where, at which stage, in the process 
the different variables are likely to have their strongest impact on negotiating behavior. A preliminary 
sampling of effects of variables by stage is suggested by our review of the empirical literature. 
We are making conceptual progress toward developing a differentiated approach to the study of 
negotiating behavior in international negotiations. The discussion above suggests that it is possible to 
distinguish among types of flexible behavior that occur in different stages of a negotiation. We can 
also distinguish among types of influences on these measures of flexibility, making it possible to 
explore relationships between independent (types of influences) and dependent (flexibility indicators) 
variables as time-specific effects in the negotiation process. We begin appropriately with a taxonomy 
of influences and behaviors as shown in Table 1. The table is organized by type of influence, how 
it operates in negotiation, the aspect of flexibility affected, and when (what stage) the effects are likely 
to occur. Key references to studies are also included. 
The effects shown in the table are between two variables, an aspect of the negotiating situation and 
negotiating behavior. Some variables have positive effects in terms of facilitating agreements. Among 
the issue variables, delinking ideologies, fractionating issues, and salient solutions should make 
agreements easier to attain. The background factors of preparation consisting of bilateral study and 
familiarity with the others' positions are likely to have positive effects. So too would amiable 
relationships, peripheral locations and light media coverage (context), shared responsibility for 
outcomes and informal meetings (structure), and deadlines (situation). Other variables are likely to 
have negative effects, making impasses more probable. Examples are when position on issues are 
linked to ideologies, attempts are made to seek comprehensive agreements, preparation consists of 
unilateral strategizing, the talks are held at central locations with wide media coverage, attractive 
BATNAs are available, representatives have sole responsibility for outcomes, their nation has a power 
advantage, and there is a lack of deadlines. But, it is also possible that the effects of variables 
hypothesized to impact on the process in early phases (e.g. prenegotiationpreparation, familiarity with 
opponents) dissipate in later stages. 
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We know less about how these variables combine to produce flexible or inflexible behavior in the 
different stages. We also know little about which variables are the Stronger determinants of flexibility 
in the context of the situations where they act together. Furthermore, it would be interesting to 
explore the reasons why negotiators choose to be flexible or inflexible when confronted by pressures 
to go in either direction, as when a situation has elements hypothesized to produce flexible behavior 
as well as elements that would encourage inflexible behavior or when flexibility is encouraged in 
some stages but discouraged in other stages. A step is taken toward developing a methodological 
approach suitable for addressing these issues. The approach is illustrated with a first experiment 
designed to explore relationships among several situational and behavioral variables. 
Embedding Experiments in Simulations 
The approach combines a concern for the generality of findings with analytical rigor in exploring 
hypotheses. While many simulations reflect a balance between these two concerns, some place more 
emphasis on the one -- e.g., generality -- or the other -- e.g., rigor. An advantage of the approach 
is that an investigator is forced to specify relationships between variables as they are thought to 
operate in real-world settings. A disadvantage is that we can never reproduce a case in all its 
contextual detail; nor can we capture the real- world pressures that impinge on negotiators and their 
support staffs. [Detailed discussions of simulation as a research tool can be found in Guetzkow and 
Valade (1981) and in Mahoney and Druckman (1975). For a discussion of the underlying philosophy 
for simulation research, see Raser, Campbell and Chadwick (1970).] 
Simulations are attempts to create or recreate situations within which decisions are made and actions 
taken. The way these situations are represented is important. Also important is the way they are 
treated in the design of experiments. In some designs, only features of the immediate situation are 
varied within the setting of a particular negotiation. In other designs, both the situation and the 
context are varied. This distinction has implications for stages of research: Exploring the effects of 
varied situations on negotiation processes that occur within a particular context or issue area may 
precede efforts to compare processes occurring in varied contexts (e,g., arms control, trade, cease-fire 
talks). The experiment described below takes the first step. The effects of situational variables (e.g., 
type of representation, time pressures) operating within a particular context (international 
environmental regulation) are examined. 
This approach is synthetic. It integrates existing knowledge about the way situations influence 
negotiating behavior. The integration is achieved by combining these variables in ways that resemble 
how they operate in actual cases It is also analytic. An attempt is made to evaluate the impacts of 
these variables on bargaining decisions, both in combination and taken singly. While capturing 
complexity in design, the simulation permits us to evaluate impacts in analysis. Moreover, by 
combining variables, we may be closer to representing the way they operate in the real world, making 
it possible to connect with actual cases. 
The field is ready for this approach. It is now apparent that neither the case study nor the laboratory 
experiment achieves a proper balance between analytical rigor and real-world relevance. The case 
study is context-specific; the laboratory experiment is usually far removed from the contexts where 
actual negotiations occur. Complex simulations would seem to be closer to achieving the desired 
balance (see also Winham, 1991). However, in attempting to reproduce "reality," simulation 
designers often confuse sources of variation in the observed behavior of negotiators; this problem is 
referred to in statistical analysis as multicollinearity. The challenge for analysts is to situate the 
behavior of interest appropriately in a complex setting where many variables operate simultaneously 
while also distinguishing among these variables in terms of their relative impacts on that behavior. 
Both these aims have guided the work to be reported in the sections to follow. 
Negotiation Scenarios as "Packages" of Variables: Hypothesized Flexibility and 
Inflexibility 
The exercise was a simulation of an international negotiation on the regulation of industrial emissions 
of gases contributing to the depletion of the ozone layer. Thirty-five "nations" participated in the 
negotiation, referred to as the Vienna talks on "Cooperative Measures to Reduce the Depletion of the 
Ozone Layer." The nations took different positions on the key issue - to establish an international 
commission that would set standards and regulate emissions in each of the participating countries. 
At issue was the status of the commission regarding its regulation authority and policing powers. 
Arranged on a seven step scale, positions ranged, at one end (I), from a commission that would have 
no authority to regulate the standards that it sets to, at the other end (7), one that would have 
regulation authority with strict policing for violations by nations. Participants were asked to take the 
role of a national representative whose nation's initial position was step 1 on the scale. They were 
told that while their government accepted the idea of a commission in principle, it was cautious about 
subscribing to standards imposed by an international body that would restrict its own domestic 
regulatory policies with regard to the country's private sector. 
The background information and assigned positions were followed by descriptions of the situation 
confronting them at each of four stages of the talks: a prenegotiation planning stage, an early 
agenda-forming stage, the "give and-take," and an endgame. At each stage, certain aspects of the 
situation were highlighted by underlining them in the descriptions. These were the key variables 
hypothesized to produce flexibility or inflexibility: Each variable was manipulated in two versions of 
the negotiation; for example, in one version, the representative was his or her country's chief of 
delegation while in the other, he or she was a delegate-advisor to the chief of delegation. The aspects 
contained within each stage are listed in Table 2 along with references to earlier studies which 
document impacts on negotiating behavior. Across the four stages, 16 variables are represented. Six 
variables are repeated in two or more stages, bringing the total to 22 manipulated aspects of the 
negotiating situation for each of the experimental conditions. 
The variables were embedded within a description of the situation confronting the "delegate." For 
example, in the prenegotiation stage of one condition (hypothesized flexibility), delegates were told 
that, "(A)s a member of your government's delegation, your role consists of advising the head of the 
delegation about positions and tactics. As one of the delegation's advisors, you are not directly 
accountable to constituents or government agencies for the advise you offer. You are to use your 
preparation time to study the issues both with members of your own and the other delegations." In 
the contrasting condition (hypothesized inflexibility), they were told that, "(Y)ou are your delegation's 
primary representative with sole responsibility for producing an outcome that is acceptable to your 
constituents and the government agencies that have a vested interest in the outcome of the talks. You 
are to use your preparation time to prepare a strategy for the upcoming talks." During the endgame 
stage they were told in one condition (hypothesized flexibility) that, "(Y)ou and the other delegates 
are faced with a decision dilemma: you must decide whether to strike an agreement on available 
terms, to conclude the talks without an agreement, or to continue negotiating in a reconvened forum 
at a different time ... (t)his dilemma is particularly salient since you are negotiating in the face of a 
deadline which is about to expire ...(t )he alternative to reaching an agreement is to maintain the 
current situation ... which is unacceptable to your government." In the contrasting condition, 
delegates were told that, (T)here is no official deadline for concluding the talks although most 
delegations agree that after six rounds participants have had sufficient opportunities to arrive at an 
agreement. The alternative to reaching an agreement is to maintain the current situation. .. (which) 
is acceptable to your government." 
Table 2 
Variables by Stages 
Prenegotiation 
Planning 
Variables References 
Positions linked or Druckman and Zechmeister 
not linked to political (1973)' 
ideologies 
Representing your govern- Druckman (1971, 1973); 
ment as either the primary Druckman et al. (1972) 
representative or as a 
delegate-advisor 
Planning as either strate- Bass (1966); Hammond (1966); 
gizing or studying the Druckman (1968) 
issues 
Familiarity with opponents' Johnson (1967); Muney and 
positions as familiar or Deutsch (1968) ; Druclcman and 
unfamiliar Broome (1991) 
Amiable or antagonistic Hopmann & Walcott (1973); 
relations among parties Druckman and Broome (1991) 
Setting the Stage* Location of talks as either Galtung (1964) 
a central or peripheral 
locat ion 
Format of meetings as Galtung (1964) 
formal or informal 
Seeking either comprehen- Fisher (1964); Hopmann (1986) 
sive or partial agreements 
National either a power Hopmann (1978) ; King (1979) 
advantage or a power dis- 
advantage 
The Give-and-Take** Salient solutions (coordina- Schelling (1960); Benton 
tion points) do or do not and Druckman (1973) 
exist 
Other parties make many or Siege1 and Fouraker (1960); 
few concessions Bartos (1974) ; Druckman and 
Bonoma (1976) 
Conference leadership Underdal (1992) 
innovative or not 
Media coverage is light Brown (1977); Druckman 
or heavy; the conference and Rozelle (1975) 
is either visible or not 
The Endgame*** A deadl ine  e i t h e r  e x i s t s  o r  P r u i t t  and Drews (1969);  
does no t  e x i s t  Bass (1966);  Druckman e t  
a l .  (1991) 
There i s  an a t t r a c t i v e  Fisher  and Ury (1981);  
a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  a  nego t i a t ed  Thibaut and Kelley (1959) 
agreement (BATNA) 
A s o l u t i o n  is  suggested by P r u i t t  (1981) 
a  mediator o r  by the  o t h e r  
p a r t i e s  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
* The v a r i a b l e s  of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  r o l e ,  f a m i l i a r i t y ,  and type of r e l a t i o n s h i p  
a r e  repea ted  i n  t h i s  s t a g e .  
** The v a r i a b l e  of type of r e l a t i o n s h i p  with o t h e r  na t ions  i s  repea ted  i n  t h i s  
s t a g e  . 
*** The v a r i a b l e s  of  s a l i e n t  s o l u t i o n s  and media coverage a r e  r epea ted  i n  t h i s  
s t a g e  .. 
From Hypothesized Inflexibility to Flexibility 
The contrasting conditions described above were designed to produce either relatively flexible or 
inflexible behavior in each stage of the talks. It would also be possible to explore the effects of 
mixing the scenarios for the different stages. One variation consists of presenting the "inflexible" 
scenarios in the first three stages, concluding with a "flexible" scenario in the endgame. This 
particular combination would permit an evaluation of an impasse-resolution "technique:" If delegates 
are inflexible through three stages of the talks, do they become flexible in an endgame with a 
deadline, an unattractive alternative to a negotiated agreement, and a mediator present? This 
condition was included in the experimental design; it consisted of a package where the variables 
hypothesized to produce inflexibility where embedded in the scenarios for stages 1-3 and those 
hypothesized to produce flexibility were part of the description of the endgame. Twenty-one page 
packages containing the stage scenarios for each of the three conditions were arranged for distribution 
in a randomlydetermined order. The variables embedded in the scenarios for each experimental 
condition are shown in Table 2a. 
Perceptions, Decisions, and Tactics 
Following each stage scenario, "delegates" were asked a number of question about their perceptions 
of the situation, their decisions about positions, and tactics. The first question asked them to 
indicate, on a five-step scale, their view of the situation (at this stage) as a win-lose contest or a 
problem-solving debate. They were then asked three questions about their position on the seven- step 
scale: how far are you willing to move (their "resistance point"), what is your desired outcome, and 
what do you think is the likely outcome. Then, the were asked to choose among alternative tactics 
that they would use in the talks: whether they plan to "hang tough" (a maximalist strategy), to seek 
a fair agreement through equal compromises, to be willing to make major concessions (a minimalist 
strategy), or to vacillate between hanging tough and making concessions. Additional perceptual 
questions included the extent to which they viewed the positions at the ends of the scale as 
incompatible, how their nation' position compares to those taken by other nations, the extent to which 
they wanted their position to prevail, and how satisfied they would be with a compromise outcome. 
A final set of questions, presented after the endgame, asked about how well they identified with their 
assigned roles and the extent to which they thought the scenario was realistic. 
Delegates were given one more task at the conclusion of each stage. They were asked to perform 
paired-comparisons among all the underlined aspects of the situation contained within each stage 
scenario. To do this, they would compare each aspect (variable) against each of the other aspects in 
terms of which made them more flexible: For example, does having an ideology make you more or 
less flexible than if you are your nation's primary representative? All the pairings were arranged in 
a matrix format that required them simply to circle "more" or "less" for each comparison (five 
variables resulted in ten comparisons). To help them with this task, they were given a practice 
exercise with an example drawn from the well-known study of the American Soldier (Stouffer et al., 
1949). The results of these comparisons permitted a scaling of the variables in terms of relative 
importance, and will be discussed below. 
Scientists at IIASA and Diplomats at the Vienna Academy 
The simulation was conducted with two samples of role players. One sample consisted largely of 
participants in the Young Scientists' Summer Program at the International Institute of Applied Systems 
Analysis @ASA). The 41 participant were Ph.D. students or recent Ph.D. recipients in the sciences 
from over ten countries: Most were studying environmental science, population demography, or 
mathematics; the common language at IIASA is English. The other sample consisted of 17 diplomats 
Table 2a 
Variables by Conditionsn 
Stage 
Prenegotiation 
Planning 
Setting the Stage 
A 
- - B 
Positions not Positions linked to 
linked to ideologies ideologies 
Delegate 
Studying 
Primary representative 
S trategizing 
Familiar with opponents Unfamiliar with opponents 
Amiable relations Antagonistic relations 
Peripheral location Central location 
Informal format Formal format 
Partial agreements Comprehensive agreements 
Power disadvantage Power advantage 
Delegate Primary representative 
Familiar and amiable Unfamiliar and 
relations antagonistic relations 
The Give-and-Take Salient solutions No salient solutions 
The Endgame 
Others make many Others make few 
concessions concessions 
Leadership is innovative Leadership is not innovative 
C 
-
Same as B 
Same as B 
Same as B 
Light media coverage Heavy media coverage 
Amiable relations Antagonistic relations 
A deadline No deadline Same as A 
Attractive alternative No attractive alternative 
Mediator suggests a solution Other parties suggest a solution 
Salient solution No salient solution 
Light media coverage Heavy media coverage 
Condition A is hypothesized flexibility; B is hypothesized inflexibility; C is from 
hypothesized inflexibility to flexibility. 
in-training at the Vienna Academy of Diplomacy: Seven were from Czechoslovakia, 7 from Poland, 
2 from Hungary, and one (the course instructor) from Austria; English is the lingua franca for these 
studentdiplomats. Since English was not the primary language for many of these participants, care 
was taken to define unfamiliar words (e.g., vacillate) and to explain the procedures for the difficult 
task of making paired-comparisons. While noting some problems of interpretation due to language 
difficulties, it is also the case that the mix of native tongues represented in these samples is similar 
to the mix that exists in many international negotiations. 
The three conditions were run for the IIASA sample: The random distribution by condition was 13 
in the hypothesized flexibility condition (condition A), 15 in the hypothesized inflexibility condition 
(condition B), and 13 in the condition of hypothesized inflexibility to flexibility in the final stage 
(condition C). Due to the small size of the Vienna Academy sample, only conditions A and B were 
run with 9 role players in A and 8 in B. Results were compared for the two samples. 
Results 
Three types of findings are reported. First, condition effects on decisions and perceptions of the 
combination of variables contained in the stage scenarios are presented. Second, condition differences 
on correlations among the perceptions and decisions are discussed. And, third, the results of the 
paired-comparisons analysis, showing the relative importance of the variables within stages and 
conditions, are shown. Results obtained from each of these analyses are presented for both samples. 
Im~acts of the Conditions ("Packages" of Variables) on Decisions and Perceutions. The effects of 
the experimental conditions on the outcome, decisions on positions, strategy preference, and 
perceptions are shown in Table 3 for the IIASA sample and in Table 4 for the Vienna Academy 
sample. Difference in the means on each dependent variable (except outcomes) were analyzed by a 
conditions by stages analysis of variable with stages as a repeated measure: This analysis permits an 
evaluation of the main effects of conditions and stages as well as the interaction between conditions 
and the four stages of the simulated negotiation. 
Eight significant effects were obtained for the IIASA sample (see Table 3). Sixty-one percent of the 
role players in condition A reached agreements as compared to 43% for condition C and only 19% 
for B. Role players in conditions A and C moved significantly further from their initial positions on 
the measures of willingness to compromise and desired outcomes than those in condition B. The 
condition-A role players preferred a more conciliatory strategy than their counterparts in B and C. 
They also indicated of a desire that their own position prevail as an outcome and viewed that 
position less as a superior one in comparison with other positions on the scale. Neither the main 
effect for stages nor the interaction between conditions and stages approached significance for any of 
these variables. Only views of the situation as a win- lose contest or problem-solving debate 
produced a significant stages main effect and interaction with conditions: Role players viewed the 
situation as being more like a win-lose contest as they progressed from stages 1 to 4 (means are 3.6, 
3.3, 2.9, and 2.9 for the four stages progressively); this linear effect was evident for bargainers in 
conditions A and B, being strongest for those in condition B. The interaction is due to the trend for 
condition-C bargainers. They showed a change in perception from stage 3 to 4 in the direction 
Measures 
Outcome as Percent Aeree 
Table 3 
Results for IlASA Sample 
Condition Means' PRatio (or x? 
d - B - C 
61 19 43 5.65* (xZ) 
Decisions on Positions 
- Resistance Point 4.1 3.2 4 
- Desired Outcome 3.8 2.2 3.6 
- Estimated Likely Outcome 3.6 2.4 3.3 
Strate~y Preference 3 2.4 2.6 
Percations 
- Win-Lose Contest or 
Problem-Solving Debate 3.4 3 3.1 
- Desire Own Position to Prevail 3.1 2.5 2.7 
- View Own Position as Superior 3.3 2.3 2.8 
- Extent Satisfied with a Compromise 
Outcome 2.4 2.5 2.5 
1.78 
6.87*** (stages) 
2.17** (interaction 
with stages) 
5.19*** 
' A = Flexibility Condition; B = Inflexibility Condition; C =  From Inflexibility to Flexibility Condition. 
opposite those in the other conditions: stage 4 was viewed as like a problem-solving debate than 
stage 3. 
Five significant effects were obtained for the Vienna Academy sample (see Table 4). Seventy-five 
percent of role players in condition A reached agreement compared to only 13% in condition B. 
Condition-A role players moved further from their initial position on the measures of willingness to 
compromise and their estimate of the likely outcome than those in condition B. They also viewed the 
situation as more of a problem-solving debate than their condition-B counterparts. No stages main 
effects or interactions with conditions occurred for any of these variables. A significant conditions 
by stages interaction did, however, occur for the extent to which they would be satisfied with a 
compromise solution: Role players in condition A indicated more satisfaction with a compromise 
outcome as they progressed from stage 1 to 4; those in condition B were less satisfied with a 
compromise solution in the final stage than in any of the earlier stages. 
Effects of the change in scenarios for condition C (IIASA sample only) were evaluated by comparing 
decisions and perceptions made in stage 3 (hypothesized inflexibility) with those made in stage 4 
(hypothesized flexibility). Matched- pairs t-tests (one-tailed) were computed for the three measures 
of position change and for two perceptions. For each measure, condition-C role players showed a 
significant change in the expected direction from stage 3 to 4: They moved further on willingness 
to compromise (t = 2.28, 10 df, p < .025), desired outcome (t = 2.80, 11 df, p < .02), and the 
likely outcome (t = 3.15, 12 df, p < .01). They also viewed the situation as more of a 
problem-solving debate in stage 4 (t = 3.07, 12 df, p < .01) and were more satisfied with a 
compromise outcome in that stage (t = 2.13, 12 df, p < .06). Few of the changes on these variables 
occurred in the same direction for conditions A and B, and fewer approached significance. 
Correlations Among Decisions and Perce~tions. Further differences between the conditions were 
revealed by the results of a correlation analysis computed for conditions A and B of the IIASA 
sample. Correlations among all the dependent variables in each stage produced a 28 x 28 matrix. 
Following are some of the more interesting correlational patterns. 
a. Evidence for a concession to convergence pattern is provided by the correlations between 
willingness to compromise and the outcome. Successively higher correlations from stage 1 to 4 (.44, 
.69, .85, .98) for condition A indicates that bargainers in this condition gradually increased the size 
of their concession as they approached the agreement in the endgame. A similar pattern occurred for 
the condition-A correlations between desired outcome and the actual outcome (-.02,.33,.59,.62). 
Strong correlations were obtained between the willingness to compromise measure and desired 
outcomes, indicating that the bargainers' resistance points were close to their desired outcomes. 
These patterns did not occur for condition-B role players. 
b. For condition-B bargainers, the more they wanted their own position to prevail, the closer their 
desired outcomes were to their initial positions in three of the four stages. Bargainers in this 
condition who chose a "hang tough" strategy in the first stage were less willing to compromise in all 
stages (.47, .38, .58, .47 for the successive stages). These patterns did not occur for condition-A 
bargainers. 
c. For condition-A bargainers, the more they viewed the situation in win- lose terms, the less satisfied 
they were with a compromise outcome in all stages (-.a, -.66, -31, -.67 for the successive stages). 
Also, the more they wanted their position to prevail, in stages 2, 3, and 4, the more likely they were 
to choose a "hang tough" strategy in stage 3. However, as indicated by the results above, most 
bargainers in this condition had cooperative perceptions and strategies that emphasized fairness or 
conciliation. 
Measures 
Outcome as Percent A m  
Decisions on Positions 
- Resistance Point 
- Desired Outcome 
- Estimated Likely Outcome 
Strateev Preference 
- Win-Lose Contest or 
Problem-Solving Debate 
- Desire Own Position to 
Prevail 
- View Own Position as 
Superior 
- Extent Satisfied with a 
Compromise Solution 
Table 4 
Results for Vienna Academy Sample 
Condition Means FRatio (or x? 
A 
-
B 
-
75 13 5.67** (x3 
- 
3.36** (interaction 
with stages) 
d. For both conditions, bargainers who preferred a "hang tough" strategy in stage 3 were less willing 
to compromise in the endgame. However, bargainers in both conditions changed their strategy from 
being relatively tough to being conciliatory from earlier to later stages: for condition-A bargainers, 
the change occurred from stage 1 to 3 (-.53); for condition-B bargainers, the change occurred from 
stage 2 to 3 (-.42). And, bargainers in both conditions became more realistic through time. Desired 
outcomes in stages 3 and 4 correlated more highly with the actual outcome than in the earlier stages. 
Relative Im~acts of the Situational Variables bv Condition and Stage. The method of paired 
comparisons is one of a group of methods for scaling psychological objects. It requires judgments 
of comparison between each pair of objects in a set. Judges are asked to indicate which vegetable, 
for example, is better or which color is brighter, and so on. The set of objects are arrange in a 
symmetrical matrix that contains the proportion of times each object is judged to be "better" than each 
of the objects with which it is paired. Scale values for each object are derived from a series of 
computations performed on the proportions matrix. The advantages and disadvantages of this method 
are discussed in detail along with computational procedures by Guilford (1954, chapter 7). The 
method was applied to the problem of judging the situational variables in terms of which aspect (in 
each pair) made them "more" or "less" flexible. An example of the task, as presented during the 
first stage of condition B, is shown in Table 5. 
Comparisons were made among all variables embedded within the stage scenarios for each condition. 
Results are shown for the IIASA sample in Table 6. Three items of information are contained in this 
table: the rank of the variables in terms of the extent to which each contributes to more flexible 
behavior; the distance between the variables in terms of their relative contribution to more flexible 
behavior, and a comparison of the rankings between conditions within a sample and between samples. 
Variables with higher scaled weights produced more flexibility than those with lower weights; all 
variables within a stage are scaled in relation to a zero point, assigned to the variable judged to 
produce the least flexibility. For example, being a delegate-advisor in stage 1 of condition A was 
judged to make bargainers more flexible than the other variables included in that scenario. It made 
them only slightly more flexible than studying the issues (.40 versus .36) but much more flexible than 
the fact that their positions did not derive from an ideology (. 16), that relations with other relations 
were amiable (.O8), and that they were familiar with the other nations' positions (0). This ranking 
of the variables was different than that obtained for the diplomat sample as indicated by the ranks 
shown in parenthesis. For other stages, however, the rankings are very similar, and, in some stages, 
identical. 
The fact that condition C replicates condition B for stages 1-3 and condition A in stage 4 enables us 
to ascertain the stability of the results within the IIASA sample. Stability is indicated by generally 
similar rankings for the replicated stages of the conditions. The orderings for stages 1-3 of conditions 
B and C are similar, especially with respect to the variables at the top and bottom of the list. The 
order of the variables for stage 4, conditions A and C, are practically identical, although the distance 
between the scaled positions differ. Insofar as conditions A and B were repeated for the two samples, 
it is possible to ascertain stability between them. Strong similarities were obtained for stages 3 and 
4 in condition A and for stages 1 and 4 in condition B. Although the rankings differed for the other 
stages in these conditions, there were a number of similarities: for example, being a delegate- advisor 
in stage 1 of condition A made both samples flexible; being at a power disadvantage in stage 2 of 
condition A made both samples flexible, as did holding the talks at a peripheral location; seeking 
comprehensive agreements in stage 2 of condition B made both samples inflexible, as did being a 
primary representative; and wide media coverage in stage 3 of condition B also made both samples 
relatively inflexible. Overall, the comparisons indicate more similarities than differences in ranking, 
both within and between samples, rendering the results generally stable. 

Table 6 
Scaled Weightings of Variables (IIASA Sample) 
Condition A (Hypothesized Flexibility) 
1 Prenenotlatlon P . . 1- 
More to less flexible 
- Being a delegateadvisor (.40) 
- Studying the issues with otha delegations (.M) 
- Positioas do mt derive from an idsology (. 16) 
- Amiable rdpioas with other nvions (.OS) 
- Being familiar with other avions (0) 
More to leu flexible 
- Hold* dm trlb r r paiphd loaba (.67) 
- Mi r r pow dhtmmga (55)  
;More to less tlexible 
- ~ i m i t e d  media attention (.&) 
- Having an optimal solution available (.53) 
- Having no better alternatives to negotiation (.49) 
- Having deadline ( . 2 9 )  
- Presence o f  a mediator (0) 
Condition B (Hypothesized Inflexibility) 
I P r e  . . n-lanning) 
More to less flexible 
- Positions derive from an ideology (.94) 
- Antagonistic relations with other nations (36) 
- Reparing a detailed unilateral strategy (.31) 
- Being the primary representative (.22) 
- Being udamiliu with o tha  nations' positions (0) 
,More to less flexible 
- Having a powa advantage (37) 
- Having antagonistic rdrriom with o tha  nations (.87) 
- Having few iafonnrt m e d q s  (.70) 
- Holding the talks r a ccatnl location (.62) 
- Being unfamiliar with o t h a  nations' positions (.46) 
- Being the primary representative (.44) 
- Seeking comprehensive agreemeas (0) 
More to less flexible 
- Relationships with o t h a  d o n s  have daeriontsd (2.33) 
- 0th- nations make few concessions (1.42) 
- A lack of conference lzadership (1.05) 
- No optimal solution exists (.50) 
- There is wide media average (0) 
3ag.c N m e  E ~ d a m d  
More to less flexible 
- There i s  no deadline ( .  9 5 )  
- There is a lack of mediation (.65) 
- There is limited media coverage (.24) 
- There is no optimal solution (.23) 
- There are alternatives to a negotiared agreement (0) 
Condition C (From Hypothesized Inflexibility to Flexibility) 
I men- . . 
More to less flexible 
- Having antagonistic relations with other nations (.63 
- Positions derive from an idsology (.28) 
- Being the primary regresentuive (.20) 
- Preparing a strategy unilaterally (.O8) 
- Being unfimiliv with other nations' positions (0) 
More to less flexible 
- Having antagonistic relaions with o t h a  nations (1.28) 
- Having r powa r d v m t q e  (1.04) 
- Being the primuy r e p r m v e  (.93 
- Being unfimiliu with o t h a  nations' positions (.79) 
- Holding the medngs at r marl location (.72) 
- Having few infond mcuinp (. 12) 
- Seeking comprabensive qmmtnts (0) 
More to less flexible 
- Receiving few coacesrions from o t h a  &us (.93 
- Deteriorated relations with other nations ( .92)  
- Lack of conference leadership ( .72)  
- Wide media coverage ( 3 8 )  
- No optimal Solution exists (0) 
More to lew flexible 
- Little scnrtiny by other governments (.49) 
- An optimal solution exists (. 17) 
- A d e a d l i n e  ( . l 3 )  
- Having m h e r  alternames to a negotiated agreement (.05) 
- Presence of a mediator (0) 
The strongest effects are obtained for those variables judged to produce relatively flexible behavior 
in condition A and relative inflexibility in condition B or in C for stages 1-3 of the IIASA sample. 
Five variables are highlighted for the IIASA sample. 
Studving the issues or strate~izing in ~lanninp;. The flexibility produce by studying the issues in the 
first stage of condition A contrasts with the relative lack of flexibility produced by strategizing in 
conditions B and C. These "opposite" effects for studying versus strategizing supports the earlier 
findings on behavior during bargaining sessions in the studies reviewed above and summarized in 
Table 1. 
Many versus few concessions made bv other ~arties. When other parties mad many concessions, 
bargainers in stage 3 of condition A were relatively inflexible. When they made few concessions, 
bargainers in conditions B and C were quite flexible compared to the other variables included in stage 
3. This findings supports the hypothesis that "it pays to be tough." This finding may, however, be 
contingent on such other aspects of the situation as deadlines and BATNAS. Referred to as a decision 
dilemma, bargainers often give in to the other's intransigence when, in the face of a deadline, their 
BATNAs are not better than the available terms. This hypothesis was not tested in this experiment: 
while the other's concessions were manipulated in stage 3, deadlines and BATNAS were varied only 
in the endgame. 
Limited or wide media coverage. Limited media coverage was judged by condition-A bargainers to 
produce the most flexibility in both stages 3 and 4, as well as by condition-C bargainers in stage 4. 
Wide media coverage, on the other hand, was judged by condition-B and C bargainers to produce the 
least flexible in stage 3. The contrasting effects shown for this variable, with limited coverage 
producing the most and wide coverage the least flexibility, provide strong support for the audience 
effects obtained in earlier studies reviewed above. 
With and without salient solutions. Having salient solutions available was judged to produce 
flexibility for bargainers in stages 3 and 4 of condition A and for those in the endgame stage of 
condition C. Not having these solutions available, on the other hand, made condition-B bargainers 
relatively inflexible in stages 3 and 4 as well as condition-C bargainers in stage 3. A salient solution 
had the anticipated effect of encouraging movement when it was available and discouraging movement 
was it was not available. This finding is similar to that obtained in the bargaining study by Benton 
and Druckman (1973). 
Mediator presence in the endpame. When the solution was suggested by a mediator in the endgame 
of conditions A and C, bargainers judged their behavior to be quite inflexible (in both conditions, 
mediator presence produced the least flexibility in stage 4). When the solution was suggested by 
other parties, rather than by a mediator, bargainers in condition B were relatively flexible in the 
endgame. This finding suggests that the presence of a mediator at the end of the talks induces a 
"chilling" effect on concessions due, perhaps, to the feeling that some control is taken away from the 
delegations. This is a strong effect, especially since it was replicated with the diplomat sample to be 
discussed below. 
Several variables were judged to produce relatively flexible or inflexible behavior in only one 
direction. Bargainers in condition A judged themselves to be quite flexible in their role as 
delegate-advisor in the first stage of the talks. Being a primary representative produced some degree 
of inflexibility in stages 1 and 2 of condition B. Holding the talks at a peri~heral ocation was judged 
to produce flexibility for condition-A bargainers in stage 2; holding the talks at a central location was 
not judged to produce inflexibility for condition-B and C bargainers. However, seeking 
com~rehensive agreements was judged to produce relative inflexibility in stage 2 for condition-B and 
C bargainers. Conceivably, the facilitating effects produced by one direction (delegate-advisor, 
peripheral location) was not paired with hindering effects caused by the other direction (primary 
representative, central location). Similarly, the hindering effects produced by seeking comprehensive 
agreements were not mirrored in facilitating effects due to seeking only partial agreements 
Judgments made by the sample of diplomat role players were similar in some respects, but differed 
in others from those made by the IIASA sample (see Table 7). Almost identical results were obtained 
for the media coverage and mediator Dresence variables: limited coverage was judged to produce 
flexible behavior while wide coverage had the opposite effect in stages 3 and 4; a mediator- suggested 
solution was judged to lead them to be less flexible in the endgame while a delegates-suggested 
solution was judged to produce more flexibility. Similarly, being a delegate-advisor produced more 
flexibility in stages 1 and 2, holding the talks at a peri~heral ocation produced relative flexibility in 
stage 2, and seeking a pm~rehensive agreement was judged to produce relatively inflexible behavior 
in stage 2. 
Two other variables produced strong effects only for the diplomat sample. Being at a Dower 
disadvantage was judged to result in flexible behavior for condition-A bargainers while having a 
power advantage resulted in inflexible behavior for condition-B bargainers in stage 2. Whether or 
not bargainers had BATNAs also had strong effects on judged flexibility: Condition-A bargainers 
judged the lack of attractive BATNAs to produce flexibility while bargainers in condition B judged 
having relatively attractive BATNAs to produce considerable inflexibility as indicated by the large 
distance between the scaled weights for this variable and the others judged in the endgame. Perhaps 
diplomats are more sensitive to the impact of these variables than role-players with different 
backgrounds or experiences such as the scientist sample from IIASA. 
Implications and Next Steps 
The findings can be understood, first, in terms of what we have learned about the situational 
influences on flexibility and, second, in terms of implications for the value of simulation 
methodology. Overall, the constructed situations produced the expected impacts on decisions, 
perceptions, and choice of tactics for both samples. These impacts occurred across the four 
negotiating stages as indicated by a general lack of interactions between conditions and stages. Thus, 
effects of the situations were not contingent on particular combinations of variables created for the 
different stages. They were main effects, showing that the conditions had the same effect in each 
stage of the "talks:" condition A produced more movement from initial positions than conditio B in 
both samples; these bargainers increased their concessions successively from one stage to another, 
culminating in a settlement that was close to their desire outcome. Condition-C bargainers in the 
IIASA sample showed the expected shift in decisions and perceptions from stage 3 to stage 4: their 
"profile" of effects was similar to those obtained for condition-B bargainers in stages 1-3 and to 
condition-A bargainers in the endgame, with 43% of the role-players reaching an agreement 
(compared to only 19% in condition B). 
These are interesting findings. They reveal the combinations of variables that influence bargaining 
decisions. They do not, however, distinguish among the parts of the packages in terms of relative 
importance. To do this entails "unpacking" the situations. This was done analytically with a 
paired-comparison procedure. The results indicate similarities and differences among the experimental 
conditions and between the samples. Condition-A bargainers were most flexible throughout the 
negotiation: Which aspects of the situation most strongly influenced their flexibility? For the IIASA 
sample, the following variables can be aligned along a trajectory toward agreement: 
Table 7 
Scaled Weightings of Variables (Diplomat Sample) 
Condition A (Hypothesized Flexibility) 
I (Preneeoriation Planning) 
,More to less flexible 
- Having amiable relations with other nations (1.28) (4)' 
- Being a delegate-advisor (1.20) (1 )  
- Being familiar with other nations (.42) (5) 
- Studying the issues with other delegations (.30) (2) 
- Positions do not derive from an ideology (0) (3) 
II (Setting the Stand 
More to less flexible 
- Being a delegate-advisor (.82) (5) 
- Being at a power disadvantage (.69) (2) 
- Holding the talh at a peripheral l d o n  (.43 (1) 
- Having amiable rdations with other nations (.29) (6) 
- Having many informal meetings (.27) ('7) 
- Seeking only partial agreements (.24) (4) 
- W i g  familiar with other nations (0) (3) 
rn- 
Mote to less flexible 
- Limitai media Inrntion (.89) (I) 
- Having m optimal solution available (.U) (2) 
- Innovative conference leadership (.42) (3) 
- Improved telltiom with other nations (26) (4) 
- Many con-ions made by other nuions (0) (3 
2 7 
Stage 1V me Endgame) 
More to less tlexible 
- Limited media attention (.68) (1) 
-- Having no better alternativzs to negotiation (.56) (3) 
-- Having a deadline (.41) (4) 
- Having an optimal solution available (. 12) (2) 
- Presence of a mediator (0) (5) 
Condition B (Hypothesized Inflexibility) 
I P r e n e n o w n  P . . laming,) 
More to less flexible 
- Positions derive from an ideology (1.09) (1) 
- Antagonistic relations with other nations (.63) (2) 
- Being the primary representative (.39) (4) 
- Being unfamiliar with other nation's positions (.36) (5) 
- Preparing a detailed unilateral strategy (0) (3) 
More to lesa flexible 
- Holding the talks in a central location (1.86) (4) 
- Having antagoahtic relations with o tha  nations (1.37) (2) 
- W i g  unfimiliar with o t h a  nations' positions (1.25) (5) 
- Being the primary representative (.79 (6) 
- Having few i&nn?l meaings (.a) (3) 
- Seeking comprehensive agreements (.43) (7) 
- Having a powa  advantage (0) (1) 
In me Give-and-Tske) 
More to less flexible 
-- A lack of confzrznce leadership (1.16) (3) 
-- Relationships with other nations have deteriorated (.99) (1) 
- No optimal solution exists (.96) (4) 
- There is wide media coverage (.20) (5) 
- Other nations make few concessions (0) (2) 
IV me Endgame) 
More to less flexible 
- There is a lack of mediation (1.09) (2) 
- No deadline exists (.79) (1) 
- There is wide media coverage (.76) (3) 
- There is no optimal solution (.67) (4) 
- There are alternatives to a negotiated agreement (0) (5) 
*Rank of variable in the IIASA 'scientist' sample 
Being a delegate-advisor and studying the issues (stage 1) ---- > holding the talks at a peripheral and 
being at a power disadvantage (stage 2) -- --> exposing the talks to limited media attention and 
having salient options (stage 3) ----> exposing the talks to limited media attention, having salient 
options, and having unattractive BATNAs (stage 4). 
For the diplomat sample, the trajectory toward agreement for condition-A bargainers is as follows: 
Being a delegate-advisor and having amiable relations with other parties (stage 1) ----> being a 
delegate advisor and being at a power disadvantage (stage 2) - --> exposing the talks to limited 
media attention and having salient options (stage 3) ---- > exposing the talks to limited media attention 
and having unattractive BATNAs (stage 4). 
Interestingly, the only differences between the samples are the variables of amiable relations 
(emphasized by the diplomats in stage 1) and a peripheral location (emphasized by the scientists in 
stage 2). Like condition-A bargainers in both samples, bargainers in condition C emphasized limited 
media attention as the primary determinant of their flexibility. 
Condition-B bargainers were least flexible through the stages: Which aspects of the situation most 
strongly influenced their inflexibility? The following trajectory toward stalemate occurred in 
conditions B and C (stages 1- 3) for the IIASA sample: 
Unfamiliarity with the others' positions and strategy preparation (stage 1) ----> seeking 
comprehensive agreements (stage 2) ---- > wide media coverage and no salient options (stage 3) ---- > 
having attractive BATNAs available and no salient options (stage 4). 
For the diplomat sample, condition-B bargainers followed this course to stalemate: 
Strategy preparation (stage I)---- > having a power advantage (stage 2) ---- > wide media coverage 
and few concessions from others (stage 3) ---- > having attractive BATNAs available (stage 4). 
The main contrast is between the scientists' emphasis on seeking comprehensive agreements and the 
diplomats' emphasis on having a power advantage in stage 2. 
These, then, are the situational levers of bargaining flexibility for the samples used in this exercise. 
If sufficiently general, they are the aspects of a negotiating situation that can be manipulated for 
impact, either to produce agreements (condition-A trajectory) or stalemates (condition-B trajectory). 
Of particular interest are the effects produced by media coverage. This variable appears in each of 
the condition trajectories, with wide coverage producing inflexibility and limited coverage resulting 
in flexibility. This finding supports earlier results obtained on the way that audiences effect 
compromising behavior, as summarized by Druckman (1973). Media coverage also makes the talks 
visible to one's constituents, which serves to constrain a representative: "..the same compromise 
arrived at secretly may not look nearly so bad as if arrived at openly ...( n)either party expects 
concessions in formal public conferences, and such settings are often conceived of as occasions for 
melodramas in which all parties blurt out propaganda to the world rather than fulfill their stated 
purpose" (Druckman, 1973, p. 45). The results of this study suggest that visibility may be more 
important than some other sources of inflexibility and, if so, should be emphasized in further 
investigations. 
Another variable of interest is mediator presence. The appearance of a mediator at the end was 
judged by bargainers in conditions A and C to make them relatively inflexible. When the solution 
was suggested by the delegates, however, bargainers in condition B judged themselves to be relatively 
flexible, especially those in the diplomat sample. This finding points out the possible chilling effects 
of third-party involvement. Chilling effects may occur when bargainers judge that control has been 
taken out their hands, or when they fear a decision against their interest. These perceptions may be 
accentuated when the third-party suddenly appears at the end of the talks, as was the case in this 
exercise. A mediator who is involved during the earlier stages of a negotiation who develops 
relationships with the parties, and an understanding of the reasons for their positions may indeed be 
a catalyst for increased flexibility. Flexibility may be enhanced even further by a mediator judged to 
be able to "deliver" the other parties as illustrated by Kissinger's effective attempts as deal-maker 
shuttling from country to country in the Middle East (Rubin, 1981). These conditions can be 
represented in the scenarios and the results compared to the effects obtained in this experiment for 
"mere presence." They can also be investigated as part of a broader research program on the 
conditions for chilling and hastening effects of real or anticipated third-party interventions. (See 
Pruitt, 1981, and Brams and Merrill, 1983, for a start along these lines.) 
Further Work. The experiment reported here is regarded as a first attempt to operationalize some 
variables hypothesized to influence flexibility in decisions, tactics, and perceptions. It is a basis for 
further work in several directions. One direction consists of gauging the impacts of providing more 
information about the situation. For example, background information about one' own and the other 
parties' positions was limited in the scenarios; so too were specific moves taken by the other 
delegations. A more detailed description of the way that national ideologies and interests evolved, 
along with the competing pressures exerted on representatives from diverse constituencies, would 
provide a richer context for their decisions; and, alternative "histories" can be contrived to evaluate 
effects on flexibility. More information about moves take at each stage by other delegations would 
provide a stronger test of the impact of this variable. Better yet, the paradigm can be extended to 
actual interactions where the opposing bargainers are either scripted in terms of their own willingness 
to move from initial positions or play the game as role players reacting to similar (or different) 
scenarios. Decisions made during the interactions can be compared to those made by the passive 
role-players in this study. Faced with a real opponent, a "delegate" may be either more or less 
responsive to those aspects of the situation shown in this experiment to influence their decisions on 
positions. For example, they may be more responsive to the opponents' moves or tactics than to 
media coverage or their role as a primary representative or advisor. 
Another direction for further work would explore the effects of variations in the combinations of 
variables built into the stage scenarios. In this experiment, bargainers reacted to sets of variables 
"coded" in the same direction within stages, toward either hypothesized flexibility or inflexibility. 
Mixing the directions, for example by including both strategy preparation and being a delegate-advisor 
in stage 1, would create a conflict for bargainers. They must decide which aspects of the situation 
to emphasize and which to de-emphasize in making decisions. The actual decisions are the evidence 
in favor of the one or other type of variable. Of course, we could also vary the direction of the 
variables between stages as was done in condition C: Which combination of stage scenarios is more 
likely to lead to agreements, flexible scenarios in the early or late stages? 
A third direction consists of evaluating influences on flexibility in other samples and in other contexts 
or issue areas. Although we are impressed with the similar results obtained for the scientist and 
diplomat samples used here, this is not sufficient evidence for extrapolation to other samples or 
contexts. These were motivated and sophisticated samples: Do less-experienced samples, such as 
students at American universities, respond to the situation in similar ways?, Are similar results 
obtained for a larger sample of professionals, in particular those practitioners with experience in 
environmental negotiations? Without replicating the experiment in other negotiating contexts, we 
cannot evaluate the extent to which these results apply only to the environmental issues represented 
in this simulation. It should not be difficult to embed the situational variables in 
involving security or trade issues, for example. Comparative work would elucidate whether these are 
situational levers of flexibility or the levers that operate gn& in specific samples and contexts. 
These directions for further work emphasize analysis of data collected from diverse samples and 
situations. Another important contribution of the simulation approach derives from the process of 
design. The 'art' of constructing situation forces a designer to articulate his or her understanding of 
international negotiation, the process, issues, and context in which it occurs (see Druckman, 1971a). 
The scenarios are "theories" about which aspects of the situation or context are likely to have impacts 
on negotiating behavior; the empirical evaluation of effects is limited to these variables. For this 
experiment, the rationale for choosing variables was based more on previous findings than on 
welldeveloped theories. The issue(s) selected for study are critical decisions As the key dependent 
variable(s), they must have certain properties: they should be central concerns in the simulated 
domain, be contentious in the sense of reflecting a variety of positions taken by the delegations, and 
have scale properties that permit a statistical assessment of differences in the flexibility variables. 
These criteria would seem to be satisfied by the issue chosen for this study, namely, the implementing 
of an international regulatory commission. It is now widely recognized that any analysis of negotiation 
processes must take into account dynamics (e.g., Kremenyuk, 1991). In this design an attempt was 
made to capture dynamics. We operationalized a differentiated conception of the negotiation process 
-- different activities, influences, and behaviors during different stages. Although still oversimplified 
for purposes of analysis, this conception moves the experimental work closer to descriptions of actual 
cases.' It also contributes an approach that can be used more broadly for comparative case studies 
and for diagnoses of the implications of particular negotiating situations. 
The aspects of the situation created in the scenarios can also be used as dimensions for depicting 
cases. Referred to in an earlier literature as 'superimposing general dimensions on specific cases' 
(Bloomfield and Beattie, 1971; Druckman and Iaquinta, 1974), this analytic strategy is the basis for 
comparative work. Comparison is facilitated when different cases are described or "coded" in terms 
of the same attributes. Results of a companion project in which eleven cases were coded 
(arms-control talks, environmental, trade, and legislative negotiations) indicate that some attributes 
are easier to code than others. Aspects of the setting (international and national politics), structure 
(conference and within teams), and issues are easier to code reliably than such details of the process 
as concessions, expectations and aspirations, and group dynamics within and between delegations. 
So, for example, we coded the cases on such dimensions as number of parties, relationship between 
parties as cooperative or antagonistic, number and complexity of issues, presence of third parties, 
turnover of delegates, external events as impacting positively or negatively on the talks, and linkages 
to other negotiations. By computing distances among the profiles of codes, it was possible to compare 
diverse talks in terms of similarity or dissimilarity. The calculated distances (correlations were the 
data for multidimensional scaling, revealing several interesting clusters of similar and dissimilar cases. 
(A report of these results is forthcoming.) This is merely a first step in comparative analysis. While 
illuminating the possibilities for coding diverse cases on common dimensions, it also makes evident 
a value of simulation as a method for studying details of the process -- such as negotiator flexibility 
-- not easily accessible in real cases. 
Results obtained from the simulation-experiments can also be used for the practical purpose of 
diagnosing particular negotiating situations in terms of likely outcomes. The experimentation provides 
The m l t s  are regarded as being context-relevant. They are to be understood in terms of the created eccnarios. Indeed, 
the scenarios could be responsible for the obtained results. The contribution of the scenarios can be investigated by comparing 
results obtained in response to two renditions of the situational variables: when they are embedded versus not embedded in case- 
oriented scenarios. Similar resulta would suppo~t hypotheses about general effects. Different result8 from the two versions 
would highlight context-specific effects. 
a set of dimensions, analyzed relationships between the dimensions and negotiating behavior, and 
weights that indicate the relative importance of the dimensions as influences on negotiating behavior. 
Any case can be described or "coded" by each party in terms of the presence or absence of each of 
the dimensions, which are aspects of the negotiating situation. Drawing on the experimental findings, 
the dimensions can be weighted and aggregated into profiles that yield judgments of flexibility for 
each party. By deriving outcomes from combinations of the parties' flexibility, the situational 
diagnosis (relationships between dimensions and negotiating behavior) is used as a prognosis of likely 
outcomes, such as the distinction among agreements, stalemates, and continue negotiating. With the 
aid of a computer program, diagnoses can be performed by practitioners and analysts. By performing 
diagnoses of several cases, it would be possible to compare cases in terms of profiles of attributes and 
judged flexibility. These diagnostic aids derive from the experimental work discussed in this paper; 
they are described in some detail in a forthcoming article (Druckman, 1992). 
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